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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
-vs-
Case No. 12474 
PETER LEONARD LYON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action for failure to stop a 
vehicle at the command of a police officer, commonly known 
as "evading a police officer," in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-6-169.10 (1953 as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and appellant was 
found guilty as charged and sentenced to a term of 360 days, 
in the Weber County Jail, with 348 days of the term suspended 
provided appellant: 
1) pay a fine of $100.00; 
2) pay jury costs; 
3) not associate with certain individuals as 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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,, 
directed by the Adult Probation and Parole section; 
4) surrender his license; and 
5) enter into regular probationary terms. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 27, 1977, at 4:00 a.m., Weber State Coll~E 
Security Officer Terry Carpenter was enroute from the main 
campus to the construction site of the Dee Special Event Cente: 
which he patrolled several times a night to check for vandals 
(T.3,12). The center is approximately four blocks south of 
the main campus (T.5). As Officer Carpenter approached the 
intersection of Taylor Avenue and Country Hills Drive, which 
lies adjacent to the Dee Center parking lot (Exhibit D), he 
observed a man, identified as appellant (T.23), lay down a 
motorcycle in the intersection (T.10). As soon as Officer 
Carpenter turned the corner, appellant mounted his motorcycle 
and accelerated away from the security officer's car, which 
was white with a star on the door, a light bar on top and a 
colored spotlight on each side (T.4,34). Concerned that 
appellant may have stolen items from the center, Officer 
Carpenter turned on his emergency lights after he determined 
that appellant was not going to stop his vehicle and enable 
the officer to conduct a general field investigation (T.14). 
-2-
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Appellant twice turned his heau to look at Officer Carpenter 
but did not stop; so the officer turned on his siren (T.15). 
With the officer in pursuit, appellant ran three stop signs 
(T.17,20). As he attempted to enter a driveway from Tyler 
Avenue, he lost control of the motorcycle and tipped over 
(T.21). Officer Carpenter exited his vehicle and arrested 
appellant (T.21). 
In his defense, appellant testified that he had had 
to kick-start the motorcycle at the County Hills-Taylor Avenue 
intersection (T.86). He observed a police car following him 
but believing he had done nothing wrong, he accelerated, afraid 
that the officer was going to beat hi~ up, as appellant claimed 
he had been threatened by police officers for several months 
(T.87). He testified that he was attempting to get to the 
home of Ogden Police Detective Bob Searle, a friend who lived 
three houses from the arrest site (T.88). Appellant admitted 
that he had no Utah motorcycle license, that he ran stop signs, 
and exceeded the speed limit during the pursuit, and that he 
intentionally did not stop his vehicle for Officer Carpenter 
(T.88,96,97). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SECURITY OFFICER WAS ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE 
OF HIS STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHEN HE ATTEMPTED TO STOP APPELLANT. 
-3-
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At the conclusion of the State's case, appellant 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the prosecution had 
failed to prove that the college security officer was acting 
within the scope of his authority when he first attempted to 
stop appellant (T.51). The trial court denied the motion and 
submitted the issue to the jury (T.55). 
Appellant suggests that denial of his motion was 
error, claiming that Officer Carpenter was acting without lega: 
authority. The statute governing the issue, Utah Code Ann. 
S 53-45-5 (1953 as amended), supports the trial court's decisi'. 
providing in pertinent part: 
"Members of the police or security 
department of any state institution of 
higher education ... shall be peace 
officers and shall also have all of the 
powers possessed by policemen jn cities 
... providing, however, that such powers 
may be exercised only in cities and 
counties in which such institution, its 
branches or properties are located and 
only in connection with acts occurring 
on the property of such institution or 
when required for protection of its 
interests, property, students, or 
employees. " (Emphasis added) 
The fundamental issue then is whether Officer 
Carpenter's actions were required to protect the interests and 
the property of Weber State College, specifically the Dee 
Special Events Center. In his testimony, Officer Carpenter 
described the factors which let to his decision to investigatt 
appellant: 
-4-
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"I observed the motorcycle. As 
I approached the intersection, it 
caught my eye immediately because 
there was no movement at all ... He 
appeared to me to lay the motorcycle 
down, and out of my own wondering, 
with the amount of destruction we've 
had at the Dee Center, I wondered had 
he been involved with something at 
the Dee Center. Were his arms full 
of things that he was trying to ditch 
or something like that? Was some-
thing wrong with his bike? Had it 
quit? I had no idea. It was 4:00 
o'clock in the morning. I assumed 
that he was either having problems or 
he was hiding from me ..• " (T.10) 
"Initially when I made the turn, 
my intentions were to inquire of him 
who he was, what he was doing at this 
time of morning .•. " (T.11-12) 
"If in fact he had been on the 
Dee Center, it would have been very 
easy to find motorcycle prints, so 
my intentions then were to get close 
enough to see him, to see if he may 
have had anything in his hands, if he 
could have been stealing anything from 
the Dee Center. That was the main 
thing. . " (T.12) 
"How was I acting? Definitely 
on behalf of the college. They're 
the ones that put me to check the Dee 
Center. That's what my whole pur-
pose for being there was to check the 
Dee Center on behalf of the college." 
(T.14) 
From this testimony it is clear that Officer Carpenter 
was acting in furtherance of his statutory mandate to protect 
the interests and property of the college. Cognigant of past 
-5-
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vandalism at the nearby Dee Center, he sought to investigate 
appellant, who was acting suspiciously, and determine if he 
had stolen items from the center, the protection of which 
was a duty of his employment. 
The instant case is distinguishable from State in 
the Interest of Hurley, 28 Utah 2d 248, 501 P.2d 111 (1972), 
in which a college security officer interrogated two juvenile' 
who appeared to be tampering with a vehicle parked in an 
alley a half block from the University of Utah campus. The 
youth scuffled with the officer, Hurley was arrested, and cor.-
victed of interfering with an officer. The Utah Supreme Coun 
reversed, finding University interests "too remote and indire: 
to invoke the extraterritorial exception." Protecting the 
cars of unknown persons in an off-campus alley is not analagc. 
to the instant case, where the security officer intervened 
because he had reasonable cause to believe that the property1 
the college may have been vandalized and/or stolen by appella: 
Protecting real or personal property of a college includes 
surveillance, pursuit and arrest of wrong-doers, and recover: 
of stolen items. Therefore, if Officer Carpenter actually 
investigated and pursued for the sole purpose of protecting 
the property and interests of the college, as he so testifie: 
he was acting with legal authority in conformity with UtahC: 
Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953 as amended). 
-6-
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The Oklahoma case, Courange v. State, 510 P.2d 
961 (Okla Crim. App. 1973) is not helpful to appellant. In 
that case the college security officer arrested a person for 
"driving under the influence" when the controlling statute 
only authorized the security officers to protect and guard 
the grounds, building, and equipment of the institution. 
Since an arrest on a public road for drunk driving was clearly 
outside the grant of authority, the conviction was reversed. 
Hurley concludes that exigent circumstances justify 
the extra-territorial exercise of power by a college security 
officer, and in the case at bar compelling circumstances were 
present which required Officer Carpenter to act. If appellant 
had stolen items from the Dee Center and was transporting 
them to another location, recovery of the items and arrest of 
the perpetrator were remote without intervention and pursuit 
by the officer. No other police cars were at the scene. In 
fact, during the pursuit, Officer Carptener radioed the Highway 
Partol for assistance (T.16), but no further mention is made, 
indicating that no highway patrolman joined the pursuit and 
converged on the arrest location. Therefore, given his reason-
able suspicion, Officer Carpenter was obligated to investigate 
the appellant, in order that the security of the college 
buildings and grounds not be jeopardized. Respondent submits 
that because the officer reasonably believed that the direct, 
-7-
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immediate interests of the institution concerning its 
property were involved, the exigent circuiu~;tance standard 
of Hurley has been met and that the jury could properly 
find that Officer Carpenter was acting within the scope 
of his legal authority. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT GAVE AN APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTION 
CONCERNING THE STANDARD rem INTERVENTION OF SECURITY OFFICERS 
IN OFF-CAMPUS MATTERS. 
Jury Instruction No. 6 provided in part: 
"You are instructed that a peace 
officer of a college in Utah has 
authority to act on the college pro-
perty. He also ~ay act in the area 
surrounding the institution, but only 
when it would reasonably appear to a 
prudent person that such act was in 
fact reasonable for the protection of 
the interests, property, students, or 
employees of the institution." 
Appellant complains that the articulated reasonab'.' 
ness standard is error as State v. Hurley, supra, enunciated 
exigency doctrine and Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953 as arnw~ 
states that the off-campus actions must be required for the 
protection of the college~s interests, property, students, ru 
employees. Respondent submits that actions which are reasoo~ 
in achieving the statute's protection objectives are in fact 
required. If it is reasonable for a college security office: 
to apprehend a youth who has stolen a university car and is 
-8-
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fleeing off-campus, it is required of the officer to do so. 
Private citizens may have the option in similar circumstances 
to act or not; however, in the performance of their professional 
duties, peace officers must do what is reasonable to do, 
especially in matters of protection. If it is reasonable 
for a security officer to take away a gun from a campus trouble-
maker, surely it is mandatory that he do so. 
Therefore, a finding by the jury that Officer 
Carpenter acted reasonably in protecting campus property was 
also a finding that his actions of pursuit and arrest were 
required. While different language in the instruction might 
have been more precise, under the facts of this case, reason-
ableness is synonymous with necessity. If the wording was 
error, it was harmless, the two standards having merged in 
Officer Carpenter's professional obligation and duties. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION REGARDING HOT PURSUIT 
WAS AN ACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW. 
As part of Instruction No. 6, the lower court 
instructed the jury as follows: 
"If a peace officer acts outside his 
jurisdiction, he acts as an ordinary 
citizen and he has no powers beyond those 
of an ordinary citizen-and a person who 
evades him would not be evading a peace 
officer. However, if the person flees 
into or through the peace officer's juris-
diction, it might take on the character 
of a peace officer's activities and so 
-9-
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continue as long as the peace officer is 
in 'hot pursuit', that is directly attempt-
ing to capture or ra.tch." 
Respondent contends that this instruction is 
supported by Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-36 (1) (a) (1953 as amended/ 
which defines "fresh (hot) pursuit": 
"The term, 'fresh pursuit', as used 
in this act shall include fresh pursuit 
as defined by the common law and also 
the pursuit of a person who has committed 
a felony or who is reasonably suspected 
of having committed a felony. It shall 
also include the pursuit of a person 
suspected of having committed a supposed 
felony, though no felony has actually been 
committed, if there is reasonable ground 
for believing that a felony has been com-
mitted. Fresh pursuit as used herein shall 
not necessarily imply instant pursuit, but 
pursuit without unreasonable delay." 
(Emphasis added) 
Appellant suggests that the instruction was erronec 
"since the offense involved in the present case was at most a 
misdemeanor." Respondent, however, contends that appellant's 
statement is error, the Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp 1977) 
defining several classes of theft, which include felony of the: 
second degree and felony of the third degree, in addition to 
two misdemeanor classes. Since Officer Carpenter was unable 
to determine what was perhaps being stolen - or its value - ~' 
could not assume that if a theft had occurred at the construe-
tion site the value of the stolen item was less than $250.00, 
the maximum value allowed for a misdeameanor class theft. 
-10-
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Therefore, given the officer's reasonable suspicions that a 
felony might have occurred, he was within the protection 
ambit of the fresh pursuit statute, even if this court should 
determine that he was without original jurisdiction. Once 
appellant traveled the roadway which abutted college property 
on both sides (T.46), Officer Carpenter was authorized to 
pursue. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE POWER 
OF AN ORDINARY CITIZEN TO ARREST FOR A MISDEMEANOR WAS HARMLESS 
ERROR. 
Ordinarily it is error to instruct on abstract 
principles of law that are not applicable to the facts before 
the jury. Since no evidence was offered at trial which would 
support a finding that Officer Carpenter was acting as a 
private citizen, and the state's theory of the case was that 
the officer was acting within the scope of his legal authority 
as a college security officer, it may have been error for the 
trial court to instruct the jury that: "A private citizen may 
arrest for a misdemeanor immediately observed by the citizen." 
However, respondent submits that such error was 
harmless under the facts of this case, where the state's evidence 
was offered to prove that Officer Carpenter was acting as a 
peace officer authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 53-45-5 (1953 as 
-11-
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amended). In State v. Anselmo, 558 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1977) 
this court affirmcc1 a conv_iction for aqgrClvat€,d sexual 
assault where the trial court gave an erroneous instruction 
regarding rape of a~ unconscious victim, and the state's 
evidence indicated that the victim was alert. Although 
finding the giving of the instruction error the court held 
that "since there was absolutely no way the jury could have 
related the instruction to the verdict, it was harmless error.' 
558 P.2d at 1327, footnote omitted. 
According respondent urges the court to hold harm-
less that portion of Instruction No. 6 that may have been errm 
as the evidence that Officer Carpenter was acting as a peace 
officer is substantial, credible and supports the verdict, a~ 
~here is no showing that but for this erroneous instruction, 
appellant would have been acquitted. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the college security officer acted within 
his legal authority in pursuing and arresting appellant and 
any subsequent instructional error at trial were harmless, 
respondent urges the court to enter an order affirming the 
verdict. 
~espectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
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